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DISCUSSION 
KLA US HENTSCHEL * 
ON FEYERABEND’S VERSION OF 
‘MACH’S THEORY OF RESEARCH AND 
ITS RELATION TO EINSTEIN” 
RECENTLY, the network of interactions around the ‘philosopher-scientist’ 
Ernst Mach and especially his contested influence on Einstein have acquired 
new interest on account of several studies in which a revision of the ‘received 
versions’ concerning the “Mach - Einstein episode” has been attempted.* 
Paul K. Feyerabend has proposed among some “lessons to be learned” that 
“one cannot trust received opinions or received versions of great turning points 
of science” ,3 and started his program of elimination of ‘incorrect’, and ‘simple- 
minded’ legends in the history of science with a new reconstruction of the “battle 
about Mach and positivism: a net of confusions.“J 
(1) Even if Feyerabend oes not cite any of the papers in which such concocted 
“misunderstandings and oversights”5 take place, it is clear from the context 
that he is referring to studies of the so-called (neo-) positivists (for instance 
Petzoldt6 or Hering’) in which the influence of Mach on Einstein was regarded 
as a triumph of empiricism and an anti-metaphysical ttitude in scientific affairs 
*Present private address: Falkentaler Weg II. D-2981 Westdorf, F.R.G. The author would like 
to express his thanks to Ms. Leah Ulansey for her elimination of some of the ‘germanisms’ in the 
original text. 
*Received 14 February 1985. 
‘P. K. Feyerabend, ‘Mach’s theory of research and its relation to Einstein’, S&dies in the History 
and Philosophy 01 Science, 15 (1984), I- 22 (= F-1984 in the following citations). 
*Apart from F-1984, for instance: Elie Zahar, ‘Mach, Einstein and the rise of modern science’, 
Br. J. Philosophy of Sci., 28 (1977). 195-213; P. K. Feyerabend, ‘Zahar on Mach, Einstein and 
modern science, ibid., 31 (1980), 273 - 282; William B. Jones, ‘The significance of Ernst Mach’s 
thought for science and the philosophy of science’, Akren des III. Int. Wiftgensfein-Symposions 
(Kirchberg/Wechsel, Wien, 1979). p. 330- 331 (= Jones, 1979); Zeljko Loparic, ‘Problem-solving 
and theory-structure inMach’, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 15 (1984). 23 -49. 
‘F-1984, p. 22. 
‘F-1984, p. 15. 
“F-1984, p. 22. 
‘Josef Petzoldt, Die Stellung der Relativitiirstheorie in der geistigen Entwicklung der Menschheit 
(Dresden, 1921). esp. p. 75ff and p. 92ff.); _I. Petzoldt, Das Verhtiimisderh4achschen Gedankenwelt 
zur Relarivitiitstheorie (= appendix in the 8th edition of Ernst Mach, Die Mechanik in ihrer 
Entwicklung historisch-kritisch dargestelh (Leipzig ,I 1921) (=Ma1883), pp. 490-517). 
‘H. E. Hering, ‘Mach als Vorlaufer des physikalischen Relativitltsprinzips’, KoIner 
Universitafszeifung, 17 (I) (1920). 3 - 4. 
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and to later papers in which this point of view is adopted.8 Feyerabend seems 
to have overlooked the fact that his claim to reject all ill- or badly justified 
opinions and to eliminate irrational fairy-tales itself reflects a positivist’s plea 
for ‘clarification’ resulting in a pre-supposed adequacy of one and only one 
version.9 Moreover, that such a vilified though non-defined form of ‘positivism’ 
has penetrated into his argumentation is demonstrable, for instance, in the light 
of Feyerabend’s plea for a distinction between Mach’s ‘physical arguments’ and 
his ‘epistemology’,Lo because it is precisely Feyerabend’s phantom of ‘positivism’ 
that aims at such a demarcation between ‘hard science’ and ‘metaphysical 
background’.” 
(2) In contrast to Feyerabend’s opinion that such “a separation is not difficult 
to achieve”,‘* it is argued here that this approach is objectionable on two 
grounds: 
(a) Mach’s contributions to physics, physiology and philosophy (in a broad 
sense, including general statements on ontological and epistemological 
problems,” have common roots in very basic opinions including especially the 
following: I4 
Ontological phenomenalism 
‘Existence’ could legitimately be claimed for ideas and sensations only, 
including relations among these but excluding nonsensational entities. 
Referential phenomenalism 
A ‘meaningful reference’ is possible and legitimate only in respect of what 
can (in principle) be consciously experienced. 
‘See, e.g., H, Goenner, ‘Mach’s principle and Einstein’s theory of gravitation’, Bosfon Studies 
in the Philosophy o/Science, 6 (1970). 200-216; it should be mentioned however, that it was the 
alleged ‘neopositivist’ Hans Reichenbach, who pointed out as early as 1921 in his study ‘Der 
gegenwirtige Stand der Relativitltsdiskussion’ (first published in Lofos (Prag), Vol. 10 (1921), 
reprinted in Gesammelfe Werke, 3, 342-405). that there are several concurring conceptions with 
different emphases and thereby realized the complexity of the Mach-Einstein relation and the 
plurality of mutually incompatible interpretations of Mach (see pp. 354 - 367 of the reprint). 
*It is astonishing that Feyerabend, who pleads for a pluralism of different scientific models and 
theories, dealing with one and the same complex of problems in a mutually incompatible way, now 
believes in the sole adequacy of his perspectivally distorted view. (Compare his Wider den 
Mefhodenzwang. Skiue einer anarchisrtichen Erkenntnirrheorie (Frankfurt, 1976) (= F-1976), p. 371.) 
“‘F-1984, p. 1. 
“The search for a demarcation criterion and the different versions proposed is one of the themes 
of (neo)positivism, reappearing at all stages of evolution. 
“F-1984, p. 1. 
“Condensed in Ernst Mach, Die Analyse der Empfindungen und das Verhtiltnis des Physischen 
zum Psychischen (Jena’ 1906) (= Mz1886); E. Mach, Erkennfnis und Irrfum. Skizzen zur Psychologie 
der Forschung (Leipzig’ 1917) (= Mz1905) and completed by relevant chapters in E. IMach, Die 
Principien der Wiirmelehre, hisforischkritisch entwickel! (Leipzig’ 1900) (= 1Ms1896) and E. Mach, 
Popultirwissenschaftliche Vorlesungen (Leipzig’ 1923) ( = Ma1895). 
“A slightly different survey is given by J. T. Blackmore in Ernst Mach. His Life. Work, and 
Influence (Berkeley ef (I/.. 1972). p. 31ff. (= Blackmore-1972). 
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Biologism/pragmatism 
Knowledge in general, and scientific knowledge as its natural extension, are 
means of orientation in complex surroundings by means of complexity-reducing 
descriptions couched in terms of functional relations. 
‘Theory-conventionalism’ and ‘economy of thought’ 
Scientific theories aim at “uniform adaptations of thoughts (ideas) to facts 
(sensations) and of the thoughts one to another”.‘s This ‘economical’ description 
of factual regularities involves the introduction of terms without direct reference, 
which are interpreted as theoretical constructs with provisional, descriptive 
value. I6 
Mach’s early research into shock-waves (c. 1880), especially his use of 
Toepler’s striation method resulting in the first clear photographs demonstrating 
how shock waves look,” as well as his interferometer studies in collaboration 
with his son Ludwig towards the end of his life” were undertaken in consequence 
of his basic aim of providing visual evidence for theoretical, ‘abstract’ concepts.‘9 
Furthermore, in sharp contrast o Feyerabend’s opinion that “Mach the physicist 
criticized absolute space without ever leaving the domain of physics”20 it is 
argued here that it was exactly the premise of the above-mentioned two types 
of phenomenalism and economy of thought which formed the central part of 
Mach’s criticism of Newton’s doctrine, in his celebrated ‘Mechanik in ihrer 
Entwicklung historisoh-kritisch dargestellt’.21 The reason for Mach’s well-known 
thesis that for him only relative motion exists(!)‘* is clearly the epistemological 
fact that absolute motions are non-observable (conceded even by Newton for 
the case of uniform straight-line motion);23 the substitution of ‘fixed-star masses’ 
for ‘absolute space’,zJ as well as his redefinition of mass as quotient of force 
“English paraphrasis of the title of chapter 10 in Mr1905. 
16The rejection by Ernst Mach of nineteenth century atomism as a realistically interpreted theory 
is one of the immediate consequences of this premise. Feyerabend’s treatment of Mach’s point 
of view is acceptable but remains within the familiar lines of the secondary literature; compare 
for instance: Blackmore-1972, p. 319ff; E. N. Hiebert, ‘The genesis of Mach’s early views on 
atomism’, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 6 (1970), 79 - 106. 
“Compare e.g. Blackmore-1972. pp. 105 - 115 and R. _I. Seeger, ‘On Mach’s cu:iosity about 
shock-waves’, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 6 (1970), 60- 68. 
“Compare Blackmore-1972, p. 280ff and appendices in: J. T. Blackmore/K. Hentschel (ed.), 
Ernst Mach als Aujenseiter. Maths Briefwechsel iiber Philosophie und Relativittits theorie mit 
Perstinlichkeiten seiner Zeit. Aurtug (Faksimile) atis dern letzten Notizbuch von Ernst Mach, 
Braumiiller, Wien 1985 (=Blackmore/Hentschel). 
‘This interpretation agrees with H. Henning, Ernst Mach als Philosoph, Physiker und Psycholog 
(Leipzig, 1915, esp. p. 57ff and p. 86ff). 
“F-1984, p. 1. 
“See note 6, Ms1883, esp. pp. 191-268 (Chapter 2, Parts 3-8). 
“Msl883, p. 248 (middle of Part 6 in $6). 
“Isaac Newton, Philosophia Naturalis Principia Mathematics, first edition 1687, where uniform 
straight line motion and rest are treated as being dynamically equivalent, with respect to state- 
discerning forces. 
‘.Ms1883, p. 248f ($8 of Part 6). 
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and acceleration,25 clearly are consequences of Mach’s referential 
phenomenalism in which terms with demonstrable referent are preferred to non- 
referential concepts. His genera1 remarks on the relationship between Ptolemy’s 
and Copernicus’ theorie? as well as his emphasis on the provisional nature 
of even the simplest principles in mechanics *’ have to be traced back to Mach’s 
doctrine of economy of thought, as the only and temporally restricted decision- 
criterion between empirically equivalent theories. 
As historical support for my claims concerning the basically philosophical 
character of Mach’s argumentation I may add that it was a similar constellation 
of such general premises concerning ‘metaphysical matters’ in George Berkeley’s 
philosophy (esse estpercipt), which as early as 1720 prompted the Irish Bishop 
into arguments astonishingly similar to some of Mach’s.28 
(b) In addition to these arguments derived from activities and statements of 
Mach in the context of the exact sciences and the psychological implausibility 
of an analytic split between physical arguments and ‘epistemology’ in Mach’s 
oeuvre (who loved to intermingle both types of discoursez9) there are sources 
which explicitly demonstrate that he would have disliked such a treatment of 
his writings. 
In an unpublished letter to Wilhelm Ostwald dated 23 July 1913, Mach, for 
example, writes the following: 
The two main faults: formally unsatisfactory representation of the monistic 
philosophy, and the spurious advance on acknowledgment of my point of view by 
the official physics, are well known to me. Concerning the first, I’m confident enough 
given good intellectual mood - humour alone is not enough in this respect - to 
be able to eliminate it completely. To alter the second fault is not in my control, 
since I can only offer my opinion, but cannot impose it upon the physicist or the 
philosophers.“’ 
‘“Ms1883, p. 246, p. 258f. 
‘6Ms1883, p. 242 ($5 of Part 6). 
“See, e.g., Ms1883, p. 5lOff, p. 82ff (Chapter 4, Part 4 and Chapter 1, Part 5) and Mt1896 
(‘On transformation and adaptation in scientific reasoning’). 
“‘See George Berkeley, De Moru, English translation in: The Works o_fG. Berkeley, Bishop of 
Cloyne, A. A. Lute and T. E. Jessop (eds) (London, 1949); German translation in Schrifren iiber 
die Crundlugen der Muthemutik und Physik, W. Breidert (ed.) Frankfurt (1969); see also: K. R. 
Popper, ‘A note on Berkeley as precursor of Mach and Einstein’, in Conjectures and Refutations 
(London, 1965). Chapter 6; and J. Myhill, ‘Berkeley’s ‘de mot”’ - an anticipation of Mach’, 
University of California Publications, 29 (1957), 141- 157. 
‘?See for instance his Mechunik (M-1883jand the introduction as well as chapter four, part four 
therein or his Wiirmelehre (M-1896) and Chapters 22 - 34 therein. The diffusion of his Popular 
Lecfures (M-1895) can be regarded.as a result of this unity of representation. 
“‘German original from: Zentrales Akademie-Archiv. Wilhelm-Ostwald-Gedenkstltte, 
GrofJbothen. My thanks go to Dr. Stilp of the Ernst-Mach-Archiv der Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft, 
Freiburg for the permission to cite this paraphrase of Mach’s unpublished letter. 
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Perhaps Feyerabend would argue at this point that there are passages, in which 
Mach himself explicitly denied being a ‘philosopher’” - but all these passages 
are merely rejections of the traditional role of the ‘philosopher’ and they are 
consistent with my assertion of a fundamental unit of ‘philosophical’ and 
‘scientific’ premises and implications in Mach’s work.32 As a corroboration of 
this I may cite part of an up to now unpublished letter of Ernst Mach to Harald 
Hoffding, dated 6 September 1905: 
I was very pleased that you count me among ‘philosopher -scientists’ 
[philosophierende Naturwissenschaftler] and not among ‘philosophers’. My aim and 
my profession is not to solve philosophical problems, but only to purify the 
methodology of the natural sciences from old disturbing pseudoproblems.3’ 
Clearly the latter is a philosophical (epistemological) task in the sense of 
twentieth-century philosophy with scientific (physical) implications. Therefore, 
it was by no means an accident, that the Vienna and Berlin circles of logical 
empirism traced their programmatic search for ‘unity of science’ back to Ernst 
Mach.34 
(3) Feyerabend’s versions of Mach’s theory of research certainly is adequate 
insofar as he emphasizes the importance of ‘dynamics of theory’ as well as the 
complexity of Mach’s account of scientific knowledge; whether it is fair to 
achieve this vindication by means of condemning Einstein as “talking 
positivism”35 will be discussed in the next section. Certainly Mach was no naive 
inductivist36 and he certainly sought to integrate the use of principles involved 
in research, despite their tentative character.37 Nevertheless Feyerabend tends 
to over-emphasize passages elected from Mach’s ‘Mechanik’:3a whilst Mach 
acknowledged the use of principles and knew about the importance of purely 
intuitive thought, the systematic place for this sort of scientific activity in Mach’s 
theory of research is that of heuristics; to rely on instinctive intuitions is called 
“See for instance ‘Foreword’ to the fourth edition of M-1886, p. IX and the famous foreword 
to Mz1905, p. V and VII. 
“This thesis has been put forward in almost all earlier books on Mach (see esp. Blackmore-1972); 
see also Mach’s explicit statements inM-1886, p. VII (foreword to the second edition) or in M21905, 
p. VIII. 
“See note 30; from Kongelige Bibl., Kopenhagen. Complete letter in: Blackmore/Hentschel, No. 
30. 
Wornpare for instance ‘Appendices’ by Philipp Frank and R. v. Mises in Boston Studies in the 
Philosophy ofScience, 6 (1970), 219ff; the contributions by E. Lesky, F. von Hayek and J. Thiele 
in Symposium aus AnfaJ des 50. Todesfages van Ernst Mach, Freiburg (1966); J. Thiele, Die 
Bedeutung Ernst Maths fiir die Wende von der klassischen zur modernen Physik. Ein Beitrag rur 
vergleichenden Geschichte wissenschaftstheorelischer Systeme, Dissertation Hamburg (1959); Fr. 
Stadler, Vom Positivismus zur ‘wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung’(Wien, 1982) and further sources 
cited therein. 
=F-1984, p. 1. 
Wornpare F-1984, part 2. 
“Compare F-1984, part 1; see Jones-1979 for similar points. 
‘%See note 6 and M*1883, p. 31ff (Chapter 1, Part 2). 
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‘Grundbedingung fiir das Entstehen dieser Erkenntnisse’39 [fundamental 
precondition for the genesis of that kind of knowledge] - that is: not for their 
justification. Consider, for instance, the sentence cited by Feyerabend:“’ “Ja, 
es ist sogar gewil3, dass nur die Verbindung des stfrksten Instinktes mit der 
gr6Bten begrifflichen Kraft den groRen Naturforscher ausmacht”, which, 
however, continues (unfortunately not cited by Feyerabend!): “Dies notigt uns 
aber keineswegs, aus dem Instinctiven in der Wissenschaft eine neue Mystik 
zu machen und dasselbe etwa fur unfehlbar zu halten . . . Selbst instinctive 
Erkenntnisse von so grol3er logischer Kraft wie das von Archimedes verwendete 
Symmetrieprinzip konnen irrefiihren.“” 
For similar reasons, I can’t agree with Feyerabend’s claim that “the very same 
kind of principles which neo-Kantians tried to establish in an apriori manner 
were discussed and recommended by Mach who based them on instinct”.42 In 
his discourse on the geometry of space for instance, Mach in no way opposes 
the use of higher-dimensional geometries (as most Kantians did!) as hypothetical, 
symbolic representations. Mach’s only argument for the preference of the 
Euclidean version was its comparative ‘simplicity’ and the lack of any need to 
alter its presuppositions (resp. axioms). 43 The ‘geometrical instinct’ which is 
mentioned once44 isquoted only in the context of the retrospective, psychological 
explanation of the behaviour of elder scientists such as Saccheri or Lambert 
who (as Mach claims) intuitively adopted criteria of ‘Denkokonomie [the 
economy of thought] which were made explicit in Mach’s methodology. 
Similarly, in calling Mach’s theory of research ‘dialectical rationalism’4s 
Feyerabend misses the mark because that term ignores the phenomenalistic core 
of Mach’s argumentation. As a whole, Feyerabend’s tatements on Mach are 
therefore likely to create new confusions and at the very least have questionable 
weight in their aim of eliminating some of older erroneous views.46 
(4) Feyerabend’s treatment of Einstein’s epistemology again suffers from the 
distortions in his interpretation of Mach. Of course, Mach as well as Einstein 
believed in a strong bond between science and common-sense, and of course 
Einstein as well as Mach included an element of ‘scientific instinct’ in their 
Tbid, p. 30. 
“‘See F-1984, p. 2 for the English translation. 
““This does not compel us to create a new mysticism concerning the instinctive elements in science, 
and to regard them as something unalterable. . even instinctive knowledge with logical force as 
Archimedes’ principle of symmetry can leed astray” (my translation from the German original). 
And even at the very beginning of the Mechanik, Mach uses the words ‘instinctive’ and ‘non- 
developed’ (undurchgebildet, zufallig gefunden) as synonymous; see Ms1883, p. 2. 
“F-1984, p. 4 annotation. 
?3ee Mach’s Erkenntnis u. frrfum, (M21905), Chapter 22 (‘space and geometry. . .‘, p. 389ff). 
“ibid, p. 414. 
‘$F-1984, p. 11. 
‘6Perhaps Feyerabend’s treatment of Mach should be regarded as an example of his method of 
‘contra-induction’, recommended by him in chapter 2 of F-1976. Nevertheless, his arguments won’t 
contribute to the aim “die schwichere Seite zur starkeren zu machen” (p. 49 ibid.) but only to 
create a new. untenable version in the ‘battlefield’. 
Feyerabend’s Version of ‘Mach’s Theory of Research’ 393 
methodology.47 Nevertheless, the way in which Feyerabend in part two of his 
paper attempts to construct he similarity between their respective recommended 
research procedures is not convincing. Einstein’s postulate of the constancy of 
the velocity of light in wcuo as one of the main ‘principles’ of his 190%papeP 
on the one hand, and Mach’s recommendation of the reliance on intuitive 
principles as the starting point of scientific reasoning on the other, are not 
analogous: whilst the former is a formal postulate, comparable to a mathematical 
axiom, in that its justification is achieved only through the development of its 
consequences, Mach had principles in mind whose assumption is accompanied 
by some sort of experience of self-evidence.@ Furthermore, in 1917 Einstein 
himself (still before his final turn against MachSo) wrote in a letter to M. Besso: 
ijber das Mach&he Riisslein schimpf ich nicht; Du weisst doch, wie ich dariiber denke. 
Aber es kann nichts Lebendiges gebiren, sondern ur schsdliches Gewiirm ausrotten;” 
thus sharply accentuating the negative impetus of Mach whom he subsequently 
praised for his scepticism and independence of judgement in his ‘Mach obituary’ 
of 1916.52 Feyerabend’s claim, that Einstein ‘talked positivism’ is either a misuse 
of this outworn term, ‘positivism’,53 or incorrect since Einstein himself, for 
instance in his correspondence with Schlick, criticized the latter for his point 
of view which to Einstein seemed to be “too positivistic”.54 
(5) One last point: in his provocative “lessons to be learned”, at the end of 
his paper, Feyerabend stateP that “the faults of the received opinions can often 
“See Einstein’s relevant papers, collected e.g. in Mein Weltbild, (first edition Amsterdam, 1934). 
Ulm, 1977 and in Aus meinen spateren Jahren [Out of My Later Years], German edition Stuttgart, 
1969; see also A. Einstein, ‘lnduktion und Deduktion in der Physik’, Berliner Tageblatt, 48. Jg., 
1919. Nr. 617, 25. XII. Suppl. 4. 
“Reprinted in Lorentz u. Einstein u. Minkowski, Das Retutivitiifsprinrip, Stuttgart, 1974. 
dpSee Mach’s treatment of Archimedes’, in his Mechanik (Msl883, p. llff.). 
‘OWhich has been described for instance by Gerald Holton, ‘Mach, Einstein and the search for 
reality’, in Thematic Origins of scienfific thought . . . (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1973) German 
translation Thematische Analyse der Wissenschaft. ,. (Frankfurt, 1981), p. 203 - 254 (= Holton, 
1981). 
“A. Einstein-M. Besso: Correspondence 1903 - 1955 (Paris, 1972) (ed.) P. Speziali), p. 114; 
“1 do not complain about Mach’s horse; you know how 1 think about it. It can’t give birth to 
living beings but only destroy harmful worms” (5 May 1917 - my translation). 
“A. Einstein, ‘Ernst Mach’, Physikalische Zeitschrift, 17 (1916), p. 101 - 104; reprint, e.g., in 
K. D. Heller, Ernst Mach. Wegbereiter der modernen Physik (Berlin et al., 1964). 151 - 157. 
“Compare for instance the obscure, ‘dialectic’ arguments of Feyerabend on p. 17 of F-1984. 
s’Einstein to M. Schlick, 26 November 1930, cited completely and commented on in K. Hentschel, 
Zum Verhaltnis Phiiosophie-Physik unhand der Korrespondenz Schtick - Einstein und ergiinzender 
Dokumenfe, Magisterarbeit Universitlt Hamburg (1984), p. 165f (see also Holton-1981, p. 233); 
Einstein’s charge against Schlick has again a rather ironic background, since Schlick, for instance 
in his ANgemeine Erkenntnislehre (1918/1925) regarded himself as a critic of ‘positivism’. 
s5F-1984, p. 22; Feyerabend has also missed several important studies by Friedrich Herneck; see, 
e.g., ‘Die Beziehungen zwischen Einstein und Mach, dokumentarisch dargestellt’, Wissenschafthche 
Zeitschrift der Friedrich Schiller Universitat Jena, 1.5 (1966). I - I4 and papers cited therein. 
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be found without detailed archival studies - careful reading of a few well-known 
books suffices.” It appears to me that the shortcomings and distortions in 
Feyerabend’s paper, discussed above, simply reflect his own very partial 
orientation. To claim that earlier scholary versions of ‘great debates’ in the 
history of science are grown through with misunderstandings and oversights 
does not free one from the danger of producing fresh sorts of misunderstanding, 
perhaps ‘incommensurable’ with previous versions but certainly no great step 
forward.46 “To rescue the participants from the fairy tales that are being told 
about them”j6 has usually meant pointing to documents unknown or not referred 
to previously. In this respect, the result of Feyerabend’s paper is therefore only 
the emphasis on Mach’s hitherto undervalued acknowledgement of ‘instinct’. 
Detailed archival studies (e.g. in the Ernst Mach Archiv der Fraunhofer- 
Gesellschaft, Freiburg, Breisgau, F.R.G.) might have helped Feyerabend to 
appreciate, for instance, the relevance of entries in unpublished notebooks in 
the last years of his life; proving that the personal contact between him and 
Einstein was more intensive than hitherto known,” or that questions of 
authenticity concerning the famous ‘Optik-foreword’ in the posthumous 
1921-edition of ‘Die Optik . . .r58 are not settled as yet altogether,59 or that it 
would be better to study Mach’s commentaries on the theory of relativity in 
his extensive correspondence up to the last years of his life60 rather than engage 
in vague speculations. 
s6ibid. 
“See Appendix of Blackmore/Hentschel, note 18. 
5’Emst Mach, Die Prinzipien derphysikalischen Optik, historisch und erkenntnispsychologisch 
entwickelt (Leipzig, 1921; edited by Mach’s son Ludwig; reprinted Frankfurt, 1982). 
‘T.ee for instance Gereon Wolters, ‘Diadochenkampfe urn das Erbe Maths: zum lOO-jlhrigen 
Jubillum der ‘Mechanik’, submitted to Annals of Science. 
60A vast amount of hitherto unpublished letters to and from Mach will be collected in 
.Blackmore/Hentschel. see note 18. 
